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Responsibility-driven collective action in the context of 
rapid rural depopulation
Abstract
China has witnessed unprecedented and rapid urbanization which has led to the depopulation and 
structural collapse of many traditional rural village communities, and the decline of many collective 
functions such as the effective management of the public realm. In seeking to address this problem 
it is clear from the literature that there is considerable potential in catalyzing collective action, 
particularly where there is a moral imperative to act and the availability of leaders with the ability 
to organize the collective. However, while there is evidence that community-based collective action 
has provided effective localized solution pathways for managing collective goods when the focus 
has been on the distribution of benefits, there is little evidence about its potential in scenarios 
associated with the distribution of costs, or responsibilities. In addressing this asymmetry, we 
present a case study of a typical village near Shanghai which has successfully established a 
community based environmental management system, and describe the process, characteristics and 
influencing factors of its responsibility-centered collective action. Our findings show that smart 
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local leadership, an effective organizing strategy, and involvement of a suitable ‘core group’ was 
crucial. The strategy of mobilizing this core group, of empowering them with decision-making 
rights, and supporting their volunteered role as a ‘bridge and platform’ connecting the village cadres 
and villagers, significantly reduced the enforcement and monitoring costs, controlled free rider 
problems, and gained public support and participation, leading to a stable and sustainable solution. 
Our findings illustrate specific principles that apply to many cases in China, and general principles 
that are likely to be applicable more widely.
Keywords: Distribution of responsibility; Rural depopulation; Collective action; Rural environmental 
management; Elderly party member
1 Introduction
China has been in the process of rapid urbanization for many years, accompanied by a spatio-temporal rural-
urban migration (Wang et al., 2016) which has led to continuous significant depopulation, economic stagnation 
and structural changes in rural areas (Carr and Kefalas, 2009; Long et al., 2011; Kan, 2016; Liu and Li, 2017), 
including the decline of collectively-organised public services [Instruction: please delete the following words:
"such as road and bridge maintenance".]such as road and bridge maintenance (Liu and Ravenscroft, 2016, 
2017). Despite considerable efforts to support rural development (Long et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011), many 
villages continue to suffer from serious environmental degradation, aging populations, and insufficient 
infrastructure and public services. In this context, environmental management in these villages has become a 
critical challenge for China's rural sustainable development.
Part of the problem is that rural environmental management is a type of regional public good (Mccarthy and 
Kilic, 2015) that involves a multitude of stakeholders as well as the distribution of benefits and responsibilities 
among them. In China, in the context of rapid urbanization and rural depopulation, the mechanisms for the 
maintenance of such village level public goods has collapsed leaving a situation where stakeholders fight for 
benefits as well as seeking to escape their responsibilities, leading to the failure of effective environmental 
management. Normally, in China and elsewhere, environmental management problems in villages are dealt 
with via state action, often regulated nationally and implemented locally, or via the purchase of services 
through [Instruction: please replace "conventional market mechanisms" with "kinds of market 
mechanisms".]conventional market mechanisms (Coase, 1960; Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965). However, both of 
these approaches are hindered by inefficiency and high costs of monitoring and enforcement, and often from a 
lack of sufficient local expertise. These issues are reported to be even more serious when rural environmental 
management has been intertemporal and cross-regional (Kapoor, 2001; Dietz et al., 2003).
Theoretical and empirical research by Ostrom (1990) and other scholars has elaborated a third way of tackling 
rural problems including environmental management. Community-based collective action, when organized 
effectively, has been proven to be successful in dealing with the management of rural public goods, or 
common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2001; Saunders et al., 2014). Examples include the 
sustainable management of collective forests (Liu and Ravenscroft, 2016), construction and maintenance of 
irrigation systems (Takayama et al., 2018), and optimization of collective construction land (Liu and 
Ravenscroft, 2017).
Such findings are consistent with the history of rural governance in many countries. For example, traditionally, 
rural communities in China were acquaintance-based societies dominated by geographical relations and blood 
relations, with the typical function of helping and supporting each other; they were governed by their own 
village rules and led by village elites who themselves had common concerns and a shared context (
Feuchtwang, 1998). Thus even without government intervention and investment, communities managed to 
organize village level public goods, such as the maintenance of roads and bridges, construction and 
management of farmland irrigation systems, and keeping the village clean, tidy, sanitary and looking beautiful. 
However, whether such collective action is likely to continue under conditions of rapid urbanization and rural 
depopulation remains unclear. A key challenge is the impact of large-scale rural depopulation and the 
disempowerment of the ‘left-behind’ elderly population. These rapidly changing and un-stable conditions have 
led to the replacement of the fundamental relationship connections (renqing) by economic relations instead (
Liu et al., 2016). The Village Committees, which used to be autonomous organizations, have gradually become 
extensions of government administrative systems (Liu and Xiong, 2018), and the villagers' sense of belonging 
to any collective has been eroded.
Such conditions violate the preconditions of Ostrom’s (2000) requirements for effective collective action, such 
as the stability of community, effective governance mechanisms, and an abundance of knowledge and skills. 
Additionally, the public goods in this case require distribution of responsibilities on the part of the collective, 
which provides a challenging arena in which to foster collective action in which there is no imminent prospect 
of individual benefit or reward. This is in contrast to the many reported cases concerning the distribution of 
benefits (Ostrom, 2000) connected with common pool resources such as community forests (eg: Liu and 
Ravenscroft, 2016; Persson and Prowse, 2017), fisheries (eg: Sultanaa and Abeyasekera, 2008) and irrigation 
systems (eg: Takayama et al., 2018).
In this paper, therefore, we want to introduce a new concept, of responsibility-driven collective action, as a 
social process that is founded in care for the collective rather than in the expectation of individual pecuniary 
benefit. Using a case study of a village in China, we seek to examine how such an approach might work in the 
situation where the individuals in the collective have to assume financial and personal responsibility for a 
programme of work that offers little possibility of future rewards beyond mutual care for the village and its 
people. In pursuing this work we have been guided by the following research question:[Instruction: please 
delelte the punctuation between ": "and "To".] ‘To what extent can a new form of responsibility-driven 
collective action provide a solution to the under-provision of public goods? In addressing this question we 
believe that this study can contribute to an enhanced understanding of collective action in the context of rapid 
urbanization and rural depopulation, as well as having potential use in studying the distribution of 
responsibilities in marginalized rural communities.
2 Literature review
According to Ostrom (2002), collective action is in essence the performance of the provision of collective, or 
public, goods. And the capacity for collective action of a community is regarded as the key for the wider goal 
of successful transformation and sustainable development (Beard and Dasgupta, 2006). Research on 
community-level collective action has been carried out with respect to a wide range of issues including 
community forestry management, fishery, and irrigation, but why and how collective action happens, is 
mobilized and achieved success, remains unclear, particularly where there is no immediate prospect of the 
distribution of individual (pecuniary) benefits to those involved.
A widely cited argument of Van Zomeren et al. (2008) is that collective action is based on the three socio-
psychological perspectives of perceived injustice, efficacy and identity. Perceived social injustice, and any 
subsequent relative deprivation, has been conceptually regarded as a fuse for igniting collective action. 
However, empirical studies have shown that such connections are weak (van Zomeren et al., 2012), and that 
there is little prospect of communities feeling strong social injustice if the issue is, for example, the 
maintenance of their roads and bridges. Thus, conventionally the emphasis of collective action has been on the 
other motivating factors, particularly efficacy. Yet in few cases in rural communities in China have those 
remaining after depopulation stood up for their rights, even where it would be justifiable to have done so (Du 
et al., 2019). The socio-psychological explanation for this lack of action is that villagers have tended to make 
their decisions about whether to engage or not on the basis of their perception of others’ action. This type of 
collective efficacy has been found in social movement scenarios such as pro-environmental and anti-war 
movements (Chan, 2016; Thomas et al., 2016; Saab et al., 2015), but empirical examples at the rural 
community level are rare. Indeed, as Sandler (2015) has argued, cost-benefit considerations are often more 
significant than efficacy itself, with decisions often hinging on individual utility and cost functions. Lastly, the 
social identity of participants may contribute to the initiation and mobilization of collective action: when 
people have a strong common identity, such as the same career or blood relationship, they are more willing to 
fight for their common interests (Thomas et al., 2016). This strand of explanation is likely to be relevant to the 
case of a Chinese village, although the sense of belonging is now quite weak in many villages after the 
disruption of village structures due to depopulation (Du et al., 2019).
As this suggests, current research on collective action at the rural community level can be considered as two 
types. The first is the widely reported collective action as a solution for managing collective resources. Based 
on Ostrom’s (2000) common pool resource governance theory, community based collective action tends to be 
most efficient for managing collective resources such as forestry, fisheries, and construction land. The 
motivating factor in many of these cases is that participants in the action stand to gain financially, via the 
distribution of collective property rights to households or individuals (Liu and Ravenscroft, 2016), or via 
improved collective and private market performance (Orsi et al., 2017). In such cases it is relatively easy to 
understand how social injustice can become a cypher that motivates action, particularly if outside interests are 
seeking to divert resources away from the collective. This situation lends itself to organization and 
mobilization, especially where there is an existing governance framework that underpins the efficacy of taking 
action.
The second type of collective action, much less reported and discussed, is about the provision of community 
level public goods, and is associated with the distribution of responsibilities. We have termed this 
responsibility-driven collective action. Rural degradation in the process of urbanization is a global trend, and 
the failure of local governments to maintain public goods, such as environmental pollution treatment, waste 
disposal and village landscape maintenance, is a direct and obvious challenge (Liu and Li, 2017). However, 
evidence suggests that collective action in these cases rarely happens, even in areas where the community had 
previously provided their own village-level public goods (Liu and Ravenscroft, 2017). Both benefits and costs 
are nonexclusive, which leads to the situation that the costs of non-action are shared (i.e. declining public 
services) while the benefits of action are not pecuniary and do not accrue solely to those taking the action. 
From the perspective of an individual, therefore, the best choice is not to participate in such responsibility-
driven collective action.
Hence, the motivation and mobilization of collective action of the second type is much more challenging, and 
there is little evidence in the literature of what it actually is and how it might proceed. Theoretically at least, a 
trigger is still required to inspire people sufficiently that they reach the “tipping point” that causes them to 
participate in action (Baldez, 2002). Given the lack of immediate and direct private economic benefits, it has 
been suggested that other motivating forces are required, such as strong local leadership with the capacity to 
organize and set up rules, and potentially long term enforcement mechanisms that will ensure the legacy of the 
action (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002).
Leadership as a concept in collective action has received increasing attention in the literature, but its 
application in the field is rare (Glowacki and Von Rueden, 2015). Theoretically, leaders play a primary role in 
the establishment of goals, setting up rules, monitoring impacts, dispute resolution, and the allocation of 
rewards and punishments. It has been argued that effective leadership helps improve collective action by 
reducing the time to consensus and increasing the speed and flexibility of group action (Tooby et al., 2006), as 
well as improving group performance by facilitating the development of goals and an action plan (Pescosolido, 
2001). However, poor leadership can actually undermine the potential for collective action (Anderson and 
Brown, 2010), by failing to gain trust of others. The concept of a strategy of organizing, including motivation, 
mobilization and enforcement, is also critical and widely regarded as key to solving the challenges of 
collective action (Bimber et al., 2012). This refers to the ability to build capacity to support ongoing and 
sustained change (Ganz, 2002). There are limited empirical examples of the processes of organizing in 
collective action beyond the early stages of motivation and mobilization, and they are predominantly 
concerned with distribution of goods rather than responsibilities.
There is also work that emphasizes the significance of the participant's characteristics in achieving collective 
actions (Ito, 2012). It is generally the case that small groups are regarded as having more potential to provide 
successful collective goods than large ones (Agrawal, 2003), because of higher private returns and lower costs 
of communicating and marginalizing free riders (Fałkowski et al., 2017). Research also shows that the degree 
of heterogeneity among rural villagers is relevant: if the elite members are homogenous as a group, with their 
goals aligned, there is a greater potential for successful collective action (Vedeld, 2000). In Chinese village 
society the elites tend to be at the core of a complex network of interests, and are the most likely villagers to be 
able to act effectively as organizers and activists. Research in developing countries such as India and China 
indicate that the characteristics of village groups are also quite important, especially those with strong clan 
traditions. Even the vulnerable groups, such as left-behind women in hollowing out villages, when 
empowered, show a strong capacity for self-organization and collective action (Du et al., 2019).
In summary, most research on the motivating forces for collective action are associated with the distribution of 
benefits, making the mobilization of participants relatively straightforward. In contrast, little is known about 
the situation that occurs when collective action involves the distribution of responsibilities or obligations 
among group members. This is clearly a gap in the literature in terms of understanding both the conditions 
under which collective action is likely to take place, and the extent to which there is a genuine alternative to 
government action to provide and maintain public goods. This leads us to refine our research question: 
[Instruction: please delete the apostrophe before "To".]‘To what extent does responsibility-driven collective 
action exist as a distinct and viable approach to the provision of public goods? In addressing this question, we 
will use a case study of a rural community in China that has dealt successfully with the management of public 
goods related to landscape and public health in a manner that we can recognize as a particular form of 
collective action. By understanding how the process of collective action was motivated, mobilized and 
enforced, we want to identify potentially transferable elements which might help with such increasingly 
common issues in the widespread context of rapid urbanization, both in China and globally, and to make a 
contribution to broader considerations about the theory and practice of collective action.
3 Methodology
A single case study approach was used, due to the rarity of finding an example of a local resolution to the 
problem of galvanizing responsibility-driven collective action. This is because most rural communities in 
China have traditionally relied on direct public investment or publicly funded private services secured through 
contract markets. Located about 60 km southwest of Shanghai, Xulian Village in QingPu District is a typical 
village arising from the merging of two formerly independent rural communities. The village covers 2.02 
square kilometers, with 1602 villagers living in 631 households. Economic development at Xulian Village has 
lagged behind many neighbouring villages, with annual farm incomes in the region of 25,000 RMB per capita 
in 2018. This is approximately 82% of the average income level for the rural areas of Shanghai and less than 
40% of average incomes for Shanghai as a whole. The village has an elected Village Committee of five 
persons and a Party Branch containing all the Party members in the village (73 persons in this case) which is 
led by the Party Secretary who is elected by the Party Branch and appointed by the Township Committee. The 
power for all village decisions ultimately lies with the Secretary of Party Branch, but in principle there are 
eight village cadres, drawn from the Village Committee and the Party Branch, who could act as a decision-
making group with the Secretary. The influence and power of the eight cadres varies from village to village, 
with the previous Secretary of Xulian Village generally making decisions unilaterally. In contrast, the current 
Secretary chooses to involve them in significant decisions.
Although relatively close to Shanghai, Xulian Village has witnessed the loss of most of its younger generation, 
who have migrated to the city in search of work. This means that only the elderly, mothers and children are left 
in the village. This is a common situation in rural China, regardless of how close villages are to the cities (Du 
et al., 2019). The village has also faced significant environmental problems such as river encroachment and 
water pollution, illegal building development spoiling the quality of the landscape, sanitary waste dumping and 
unregulated poultry farming. In the past, the local government has invested considerable funds on the 
construction of wastewater facilities, village cleaning and waste disposal, but the top down input without 
villagers’ involvement failed due to lack of maintenance and monitoring, as well as villagers’ unwilling to 
changing their pollution behaviors. Little progress had been made at that time. [Instruction: Please delete this 
sentence:
"This has led to the cessation of public funding."]This has led to the cessation of public funding.
Things began to change in 2014, when a new Secretary of the village was appointed, who managed to initiate 
and mobilize the whole village to participate in the remediation of the environmental problems and the 
beautification of the village. In particular, the village successfully accomplished the demolition of all the 
illegal buildings without repercussions, kept all unsanitary areas clean, controlled informal poultry breeding 
and carried out remediation of the village river. Through collective action, the village environment was 
significantly improved, and Xulian was awarded the title of ‘Beautiful Village of Shanghai’ in 2017. In 
addition, Xulian continued its collective action to develop a long-term Beautiful Village Plan. This has gained 
support from the local government, because the village now meets all kinds of regulations. The plan also 
enjoys the support of the villagers (as they recognize that they all benefit from an improving environment that 
provides new opportunities for the development of new economic activity, such as tourism); and of the 
collective (because the community is getting stronger). Ultimately, Xulian Village seems to have demonstrated 
the potential of responsibility-driven collective action despite suffering from rural depopulation and having to 
cope with difficult issues around the need for financial contribution from those who have been left behind.
On-site investigations were undertaken in the village from April to December 2018, with a supplementary 
investigation in December 2019 that was used to clarify ambiguous information. Semi-structured interviews 
were carried out with key informants to gain detailed information about the processes that had occurred. Key 
informants were identified as we became more familiar with the roles played. We started with the Secretary of 
Party Branch (hereinafter called Secretary) who played the central role.
From the Secretary, we learned that the elderly Party members had volunteered very early in the process to do 
significant mobilization and monitoring work. In particular, there were three who operated a drop-in ‘service 
station’ in their own houses, each assisted by another two old Party members, where anyone could drop in to 
talk about their concerns and how these might be addressed. These elders referred to their work as ‘bridging 
the village leaders and the villagers’, so we chose two leader types (one Village Committee leader, and one 
village cadre) as key informants for interviews. In addition, we held semi-structured interviews in the village 
with 10 villagers and 2 incomers. The participants were selected by the interviewers on a ‘next available 
person’ basis. Interview schedules were constructed around conceptual processes of collective action, the 
formulation of rules, the mobilization strategies applied, difficulties encountered, efforts in finding solutions, 
and the final outcomes of the collective action. In addition, focus group discussions were held twice with a 
group comprising the village Secretary, village cadres, and highly respected elderly Party members, focusing 
on changes in the village before and after the collective action, the motives and main problems, and ideas of 
further improvements. Finally, in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the collective action, 
participant observations were carried out. Two researchers stayed in the village for four days, observing the 
elderly Party members patrolling the village, negotiating with villagers, and discussing issues with the village 
cadres. We also attended the weekly gathering of Party members who were discussing and undertaking 
volunteer jobs in the village. In addition, we wandered around the village to watch villagers' normal activities 
as well as to check the status of the maintenance of the village environment.
All interviews and onsite observations were written down in shorthand, and complete transcripts were written 
up the same evening. They were later translated into English. We also obtained records of issues raised and 
subsequent actions from the three service stations, and documents from township governments and the village. 
All these data were analyzed and interpreted by deep reading in order to generate a picture of how the 
collective action took place, matured to a functional level, and succeeded in resolving internal and external 
problems.
4 Findings
The research commenced from a desire to examine how collective action might be galvanized where it has 
previously struggled. The literature indicates that this is most unlikely to occur where there is no immediate 
prospect of individual benefits and no imminent and otherwise irrefutable danger to the community. In such 
cases the free-rider phenomenon arises, where some members of the collective refuse to join the action 
because they know that they will gain any eventual benefit without contributing to the cost of achieving it. 
This constrains the ability of the leaders to build a good connection with the collective, and can undermine the 
success of the action itself. The case of Xulian Village offers a different narrative, as set out in the following 
subsections, each of which is framed around the common failures of conventional collective action.
4.1 The muted injustice of the failure to maintain the supply of village level public goods
Xulian Village is the epitome of rural decline in the process of urbanization in China (Li et al., 2016), facing 
challenges of depopulation and aging, collapse of traditional community and a sluggish local economy. As a 
result, the village depends to a large extent on sustained government investment to provide village-level public 
goods. For example, local government agencies were solely responsible for the maintenance of the village 
environment, including the construction of domestic wastewater treatment facilities, as well as employing two 
workers to keep the village clean and tidy. Nevertheless, the village remained in a dirty, chaotic and poor 
condition, which was largely accepted by those left behind after depopulation. The lack of regulation and 
attention allowed some public spaces to be gradually encroached upon by illegal construction activity. Trash 
was dumped into corners and rivers, while people directly discharged sanitary waste into nearby rivers rather 
than using the appropriate facilities. Excrement from free ranging chickens and ducks was everywhere, 
resulting in a bad odor and many mosquitoes. This led one Party member to comment that:
“In the past, the roads in the village were uneven (due to dumped waste), even 
though there were garbage cans (provided), the villagers still dumped rubbish at 
random. The droppings of chickens and ducks raised by the villagers were all over 
the road: we could hardly walk. The riverside was full of chicken and duck sheds 
which was undesirable and looked awful.” (Xu D, male, elderly Party member)
Even though villagers and village cadres both complained about the environmental problems, neither thought 
it was their responsibility. The villagers claimed that the village cadres did not carry out their duties, while the 
village cadres criticized the poor attitudes of the villagers, which to them indicated that nobody regarded the 
community as their common inheritance, or fortune. The village thus became divided by personal political and 
economic issues, increasingly driven by the maximization of private interests.
In 2014, a native villager returned to the village as the new Party Secretary. She concluded that the core of the 
problem lay in the dysfunctional Village Committee and Party Branch, and that without the effective 
organization of the villagers, no work could be carried out.
“(In the past) our Committee was disunited. The Party members and cadres had 
poor organizational discipline, and they did not provide leadership, which led to 
the villagers and Party members being not of one mind.” (Shen, female, village 
Secretary)
In rural China, Party members are a special group. They are usually people who have received a good training 
or education, with high skills or good prestige. In the era of the Collective Economy, Party members played a 
pioneering, core and exemplary role in the face of all kinds of difficulties; they were very much the 
cornerstone of village-level autonomy. However, this declined after the Reform and Opening Up Policy, along 
with the collapse of traditional community mechanisms and administrative control of Village Committees, the 
system of collective learning and discussion, and decision-making by minority obeying majority in the village 
branch, were abandoned, to a position where power had been concentrated in the former Secretary.
“The former village Secretary and the village director couldn't get together. The 
Party member meetings might occur only 2-3 times a year, or even not at all. If 
things came up, he (village Secretary) had the final say.” (Xu D, male, elderly 
Party member)
Under these circumstances, the Village Committee and village cadres lost their prestige and became pariahs in 
the eyes of the villagers. The villagers could not participate in, and were not even informed of, important 
decisions, and thus became disinterested in contributing to the future of the village, and centered around their 
personal benefits. Whenever their benefits were compromised, they were likely to go and quarrel with the 
village cadres in their office.
4.2 Establishing the efficacy to work for change
By the time that the new Secretary took office there was a big opportunity for the village: [Instruction: Please 
replace "QingPu" with "Qingpu".]QingPu District had adjusted its financial support for the villages from an 
average annual sum paid to all villages to a situation in which much of the funding was concentrated on a 
small number of best-kept ‘pilot’ villages. If Xulian was chosen, it would bring huge public investment and 
significantly change the village; if not, even less funding than before would be available to the village. Shen 
spared no efforts to advocate this golden opportunity:
“Our village has a good location of transportation, but we never had such 
opportunity of investment and development. …it's once in a lifetime. Why don't we 
apply (and fight for it)?” (Shen, female, village Secretary)
After several meetings at which Shen stressed the soundness of her ideas, the village decided to apply. 
However, they had to show their capability and potential to qualify for the pilot Beautiful Village Construction 
funding. At that time there was a top down government policy of dismantling illegal housing in rural areas, 
which was called “Construction of Non-illegal Building Village” (Wu Wei Cun) at Qingpu. Even though, in 
terms of qualifying for the funding, it was not necessary to be completely successful in removing the illegal 
buildings, Xulian Village treated it as an opportunity to show their capability and potential in the “Beautiful 
Village Construction”, as well as a chance to change the environment and landscape of the village, as the 
illegal housing were always not taken care of and dumped with kinds of dirty and messy things.
Some villagers – mainly those who had built the illegal buildings - did not agree with this action. It has been 
widely reported elsewhere in China that there was forced dismantling, or the collective was blackmailed in 
order to meet the top down requirement, both of which subsequently leading to the back and forth of illegal 
building phenomenon. Shen understood well that without village level consensus it would be impossible to 
resolve the problem successfully, but instead might turn out to be a desperate failure – in terms of the buildings 
and the opportunity to secure the additional funding. As the leader she adopted a strategy that had usually been 
ignored by previous village leaders, which was to establish the efficacy of the proposed collective action by 
mobilizing the old party members as a core group which could provide a legitimate channel through which 
connect the village cadres and villagers.
4.3 Developing trust in the leadership
Many of the old party members felt intensely disappointed about the state of the village, particularly when they 
thought back to the Collective Economy era and the way in which the whole village had shared a strong and 
common vision. Shen tried hard to convince and mobilized the elderly Party members by suggesting to them 
that they could help foster a new vision of a beautiful and well maintained village. The first step was to return 
their power to them by making use of the Yi-Shi-Hui approach to discussion and shared decision making with 
respect to village public affairs. Shen also re-established regular meetings for Party members and for village 
cadres. Both meetings were designed to promote communication, discussion and consensus building. By doing 
this, Shen reassured them that the decision making process would be transparent, institutionalized and would 
involve their participation. This led one of the Party members to comment:
“Yi-Shi-Hui of Party Members used to be (the former Secretary's) own people. 
They were relatives, and rarely organized meetings... (Now, if) using money (for 
public affairs), no matter how much it was, even buying an air conditioner (for the 
community activity room), it should be discussed in Yi-Shi-Hui. (The village) 
stopped and forbade dumping of chamber pots, (this) should also be approved (by 
Yi-Shi-Hui)." (Shen, male, elderly Party member)
Another member of the Party also commented on how much the situation had changed:
“(The new Secretary required the) Party Members' Plenary Meetings to be held (at 
least) twice a month; Party Group Meetings (at least) once a month... Everything 
was able to be spoken out openly; not hidden in the heart.” (Xu D, male, elderly 
Party members)
Once the new meeting structure was in place, the next step was to enforce the working discipline of the village 
cadres. In the past villagers complained frequently about the dysfunctional village cadres. They had a decent 
wage compared with normal villagers, but it was difficult to find them even during the working day. They 
were elected to represent the villagers but seldom talked with or visited them. Shen enforced the discipline 
strictly, such that nobody was allowed to be late or to leave early, and she took the initiative to work as usual 
during weekends. For example, they organized a volunteering village service of Party members and village 
cadres (such as picking garbage, cutting wild grass at the roadsides) every Saturday. The changes were obvious 
and welcomed by villagers, which also contributed to the villagers gaining trust in the leaders. The final step 
was to help the Party members and villagers learn about the Government policies that impacted on the village, 
as a means of illustrating the potential benefits for the village as a whole. The village representatives were also 
encouraged to visit other pilot villages to investigate and learn by themselves.
Through the pro-activity of the village Secretary as well as a string of meetings to learn and negotiate, mutual 
recognition between Party members, cadres and the village Secretary was significantly improved. Through 
various symposia, Party Members Meetings, study sessions, and mutual communications, elderly Party 
members were fully mobilized, realizing that the new Secretary really intended to initiate a common vision 
that would revitalize the village.
4.4 Mobilizing the villagers to overcome the free-rider problem
Mobilizing the Party members did not guarantee that the villagers would join in. In Ostrom’s (2000) terms, it 
could be said that, at that time, the villagers did not have a common vision of the village as their desired 
homeland, and were thus not inclined to incur cost in improving it. Since dismantling the illegal buildings had 
already incurred costs for some of the villagers, ensuring the participation of the villagers was very difficult. 
The question for Shen was thus how to mobilize all the villagers to participate, and in the time available to bid 
for the additional funding. It turned out that the elderly Party members who had first been mobilized by the 
Secretary played an outstanding role in encouraging the villagers to get involved, even though it meant 
incurring personal cost.
The first stage in Shen's process involved continuous publicity and mobilization. Although all kinds of village 
group events were organized by the village committee and the Party Branch, most villagers still did not believe 
in the efficacy of the open negotiation on the implementation, and initially hesitated to participate. The 
Secretary realized that frequent personal visits to most households was necessary, but she could not cover them 
all, and was not an appropriate person in some cases. Consequently, the 73 elderly Party members volunteered 
to act as the ‘bridge and platform’ between the village cadres and villagers. The policy concepts of the village 
leaders were passed to the villagers and the villagers' feedback was returned to the village cadres, via the 
elderly Party members. This process continued until a modified plan emerged which was accepted by most 
people.
Following the success of this stage, the next was to lead by example and demonstrate what was required. As 
dismantling the illegal buildings meant considerable economic loss to many villagers, it was very difficult for 
the villagers to accept it when there was no compensation. Relying on early effective communication and an 
implementation guideline that “the Secretary took the lead, the Party members and the cadres followed first: 
NO exceptions” to remove their own illegal buildings, it still took the whole village more than a year to 
successfully complete this difficult task.
“I am a Party member…I was the first one to remove the unauthorized part of my 
house.” (Shen, male, elderly Party member)
“Her (village Secretary) father had a pig shed… In fact, it was approved officially 
and not part of the illegal buildings. However, he was also persuaded (by the 
Secretary) to have it dismantled.” (Xu D., male, elderly Party members)
Once removal of the illegal structures had started, the third stage in the process was to conciliate with those 
who had suffered economic losses, and to monitor the situation to ensure that the structures were not replaced 
at a later date. There were some key villagers who were particularly reluctant to lose their private benefits, and 
they refused to negotiate with the village cadres. If the guideline of “no exception” were not seen to apply to 
them, the whole collective process would be violated, and more conflicts would be ignited from the other, 
compliant, villagers. The elderly Party members thus took up the responsibility of persuading the reluctant 
villagers. Traditional community mechanisms were applied. For example, the elderly Party members used all 
kinds of relationship networks (renqing) to add to the persuasion, including relatives, friends and teachers. In 
the end, all the villagers accepted that by demolishing their illegal structures they were contributing to public 
benefit for all members of the village.
“There was a household at the south of the village. The Secretary and elderly 
Party members went to negotiate fifteen times. One householder even scolded the 
Secretary with a finger on her nose. We had to seek help from their relatives and 
friends. Finally, it was settled. The Secretary told us to keep in mind that there was 
a lock on the heart for everybody and you might not be able to unlock it. Never 
give up. Just find the right person who could do it.” (Shen, male, elderly Party 
members)
With the active leadership of the elderly Party members and the insistence that there should be no free riders, 
the villagers’ perceptions of the village collectiveness and the village cadres changed significantly. They 
experienced the changes personally: it was recognized that the village cadres were making efforts that went 
beyond their personal interests. At the same time, Xulian Village also fully recognized the special role of the 
elderly Party members, and formally acknowledged the Party drop-in service stations as a key platform 
connecting villagers and the collective.
Although dismantling illegal buildings helped improve the landscape and the quality of the public spaces, there 
remained many other challenges for the wider community, such as the long term management of the village 
environment. In particular, the residents would see their losses as ongoing, due to the loss of income from 
keeping poultry and livestock. Both the village cadres and the villagers were confident that those problems 
could eventually be resolved with new funds from the government for improved village management. The 
villagers’ participation increased via all kinds of opportunities offered by the village committee and Party 
branch, such as a number of official villagers' symposia leading to direct calls for action. Increased use of the 
drop-in service stations resulted in many suggestions arising concerning the recreation club, public facilities, 
riverside greening and other public benefits. After several rounds of negotiations, the entire village 
successfully created the long-term Beautiful Village management Plan. Very importantly village rules were 
also agreed and implemented.
Ongoing monitoring is a core element in long-term management of the Beautiful Village Plan. Due to the 
scattered distribution of households, there would always be potential low efficiency and high cost challenges 
in the government-led model or the market-based model to manage monitoring and enforcement. In Xulian 
Village, the nine elderly Party members who oversaw the three drop-in service stations volunteered to 
undertake daily inspections and monitoring, with a camera and patrol records provided by the collective. The 
results were noted daily and were made available for public viewing. Such frequent patrolling not only helped 
with the enforcement of the village plan, but also reinforced to the villagers the general importance of the 
village rules. In addition, other local problems were identified and resolved in their infancy by the elderly 
Party members. However, the village did not actually have to bear any cost, and the elderly Party members 
never complained about a lack of compensation for their efforts. They knew that the monitoring sometimes 
offended others (and thus they were losing ‘standing’ in the community), but they persisted because they 
believed it was the right thing to do:
“The elderly cadres and the elderly Party members were relatively honest and 
prestigious. They came to your house time after time and you could really feel 
embarrassed. Eventually, villagers would listen to you.... For some stubborn 
villagers, sometimes we chose to persuade their friends and relatives first, and 
then they would join in. Those Party members or cadres that had connections with 
the (stubborn) villagers were also sought out, to talk to them.” (Shen, male, village 
cadre)
“An elderly woman at the bridgehead built a (illegal) fence. At first, she would not 
listen to anything we had to say. Then (old Party member) persuaded her husband, 
and he successfully convinced his wife. It took three visits (coming to house) to 
solve the problem. There were individuals that required five visits.… To tell the 
truth, I am offending others all the time (and losing my renqing)." (Xu H., male, 
elderly Party members)
The role of the Party members drop-in service stations in acting as ‘bridge and platform’ between the villagers 
and the leaders was well received. There was no doubt that many aspects of the construction and management 
of the Beautiful Village Plan, no matter big or small, had impacts on most villagers. Some villagers had some 
suggestions or feedback, but they were reluctant to go to the village committee as it was inconvenient; with a 
drop-in service station nearby they could simply talk to the person on duty, and the elderly Party members 
would do the rest. The Party members were responsible for receiving and recording various problems, and for 
doing whatever they could to solve them; unresolved issues would be passed to the cadres. In addition, the 
village Secretary and the village cadres would visit the drop-in service stations every Saturday to help solve 
problems, and to learn about the various ideas and needs of the villagers. For example, some villagers 
complained that the requirement that frames for growing vegetables should be no higher than 1 m caused 
inconvenience to their daily life because they could not cultivate loofah, cucumber and other crops. However, 
it was felt that the riverside – where most of the vegetables were grown - should appear well managed instead 
of being encroached by the vegetables. Others suggested that the village collective should strive for more 
economic projects and opportunities as the village became increasingly attractive. All such issues and ideas 
were submitted to the Village Committee Meetings through the drop-in service stations, with specific solutions 
proposed. For instance, after several consultations between the village cadres and villagers, it was decided to 
set aside a special area from the village collective land for villagers to grow tall vegetables, and that those 
villagers had to pay a rent for this land.
Based on their achievement, it was envisaged that the village would be qualified for the governmental rewards 
for good performance (yi jiang dai bu), which enabled the Village to provide subsidies for individual villagers. 
Each villager signed a contract with the collective agreeing to abide by the local rules, and those who complied 
would get a subsidy of 120 yuan per capita annually, depending on the rewards the village could earn from the 
township government's inspections. It transpired that the subsidy was enough to cover losses incurred from 
reduced levels of poultry raising and vegetable planting.
With these joint efforts, Xulian Village's long-term management proved successful, and was acknowledged by 
the villagers as well as the district and town governments. The village was awarded the prize of ‘Beautiful 
Village of Shanghai in 2018’. In terms of the rural environment, the approach not only solved problems such as 
unsanitary dumping of wastes, but also achieved the control of livestock and poultry farming and of emptying 
chamber pots in the river. Rivers, roads and farmland were kept clean and tidy, becoming an integral part of 
the village landscape.
“DongZhuang Village in Liantang Town became Beautiful Village earlier, but its 
environment was not as good as ours... (Xulian Village) has laid solid foundations 
and we want to be the national level (Beautiful Village winner).” (Xu H., male, 
elderly Party members)
A particular advantage of collective action in this long-term village management was cost-efficiency. 
According to data from the village committee, before the collective action, the government invested about 
300,000 RMB each year, hiring as many as 21 villagers to clean roads and rivers, but the results were 
unsatisfactory. However, under the collective action, the environment was greatly improved and it cost only 
200,000 RMB for the village cleaners. The household subsidy of 120 RMB per capita for cooperative villagers 
was funded from governmental rewards only if the whole village had passed the inspection with a high enough 
score annually. Xulian Village managed to obtain the top-level rewards of 800,000 RMB. Compared with top 
down governance model, the collective action model of Xulian Village has a sharply reduced cost and a high 
level of performance. In addition, most of the financial benefits were captured directly by the villagers, rather 
than external contractors, which caused further spillover effects in villager behaviors:
“In the past, the village carried out 1 or 2 cleanings every month. Although there 
were villagers hired for cleaning, the phenomenon of littering after the sweep was 
still common...Now it's rarely seen.” (Shen, male, elderly Party member)
Finally, through this responsibility-driven collective action, the relationships between villagers were improved, 
and the community governance mechanisms have been reshaped and given a new life. With the influence of 
the elderly Party members as the ‘platform and bridge’, the good relationships between the village cadres and 
the villagers has also been improved, a sense of community has been fostered, and the common goal of 
building a beautiful homeland has materialized:
“Before, villagers quarreled with village cadres frequently. Now it's gone. The 
villagers and the village cadres stay more harmonious.... I am also willing to 
cooperate and make my own contribution. (For example) I noticed there was 
garbage in the roadside, and the village cadres were not available at that time. I 
just called the tractor to cart it away (at my own expense)." (Xu Y., male, founder 
of rural cooperatives)
5 Discussion
Even though collective action is considered effective for solving rural community affairs, most studies are of 
scenarios capable of generating private interests from the collective problems. Rural environmental 
management, as a type of regional public good, is more concerned with the sharing of responsibilities within 
the community. Our findings from Xulian village demonstrate how such collective action might be initiated, 
mobilized and maintained in the long term in a Chinese village, even under the context of rapid rural 
depopulation. The findings offer new insights in how three aspects - the use of strong leadership, an 
appropriate strategy for organizing, and identification of a suitable core group - can facilitate collective action 
to function well in the distribution of responsibilities. That collective action can function successfully in this 
scenario is a new finding, as is the finding that all three elements appear to be essential components in 
achieving the action. .
The concept of leadership is receiving increasing attention in evolutionary models of collective action (Hooper 
et al., 2010; Price and Van Vugt, 2014), but it remains based on the assumption that there will be personal 
benefits for both the leaders and followers, acting as incentives. However, these ideas have not yet been 
supported by empirical studies (Glowacki and von Rueden, 2015). In our case study it is not so obvious that 
the good leadership demonstrated by the new Party Secretary was motivated by the prospect of personal gain. 
It is certainly the case that the Secretary was native to the village and understood what mattered to different 
types of villagers; this allowed her to demonstrate strong leadership not by increasing her power, but rather by 
returning power to the collective village processes of decision-making, and making public affairs transparent. 
In addition, she showed her enthusiasm for the community, by personally pioneering whatever she could:
“The Secretary is a decent person. She arrives at work by 7:30 am, and continues 
working at village on Saturday and Sunday. In almost everything she took the lead, 
and the other village cadres followed.” (Xu D, male, elderly Party member)
“I doubt whether we might have achieved anything without the Secretary. … The 
village committee became much more united, and determined to change the 
village…. I was impressed and volunteered to help. … If she leaves in the future, I 
doubt others would be (as) competent.” (Shen, male, elderly Party member)
There is little evidence that the incentive for the Secretary was based on her personal economic interests, but 
rather on the common will to change the unpleasant condition of the village. She did ultimately acquire a 
higher standing in the village due to the success of the action, which she could not have anticipated when she 
became Secretary. As with any public or Party official, there is almost certainly an additional personal motive 
connected with being recognized (and perhaps rewarded) for doing a good job. This is not something that we 
explored with the Secretary, but anyone taking on public office must do so in the knowledge that their 
performance will be monitored and recorded.
Our case indicates that in the context of responsibility distribution, the mobilization strategy was critical and 
was fundamentally different from mobilization strategies commonly used in the more usual cases where a 
distribution of benefits is anticipated. It was impossible for the Secretary herself to pioneer everything and she 
could not bridge the gap to reach out to all the villagers. In addressing this the Secretary first mobilized the 73 
Party members, and then opened channels for them to have more influence in decision-making, distributing 
her power and facilitating them to become organized in different roles for publicity and mobilization, 
demonstration, conciliation and monitoring. Her organizing strategy was consistent with Lievegoed's theory of 
organizational development (Lievegoed, 1980; [Instruction: please replace "Glasl;" with "Glasl and".]Glasl; 
Lievegoed, 1994) in which the initial centralization of power and action (known as pioneering) is replaced by a 
more bureaucratic structure in which roles are differentiated and power is delegated.
The identification of the core group of nine followers who served as the foundation for the differentiated 
strategy of the collective, was particularly effective in distributing responsibilities among all villagers. In 
hindsight, these elderly Party members who remained in the village proved to be the right core group for the 
situation, not least because they had much experience of, and strong connections with, the collective. It also 
became clear that they maintained a strong feeling for their native village and had less concern for personal 
economic gains.
Such a phenomenon has been identified in many rural areas in China (Liu and Ravenscroft, 2017), where 
reputable elders (usually Party members) have prestige or ‘standing’ in the village, and are thus capable of 
bridging different social groups to provide a platform for all kinds of negotiations and compromise. These 
elders are usually familiar with inherited local knowledges and social networks, allowing them the agency to 
use these knowledges in undertaking their functions. In Xulian Village, for example, when some villagers 
refused to cooperate with the village rules, the elderly Party members and village cadres were able to deploy a 
range of tactics to negotiate a solution. In the language of the local culture, this was understood as the elderly 
Party members and the village cadres respecting and caring about the villagers, which bound them under a 
localized relation (renqing) pressure which is difficult to reject. Thus, much of the management cost was 
internalized and would not hinder the collective action with any long term financial burden.
Responsibility-driven collective action is clearly much more difficult to achieve than the more usual case of 
benefits distribution. It does not mean that such collective action is without benefit for the villagers. The 
difference is that the benefits – if they materialize - are available to all regardless of their participation, and 
only become available when the distribution of responsibilities has been successfully undertaken, as observed 
by one villager:
“For sure the environment is much better than before. All the houses have been 
polished white as well. The roads are well built. But we farmer do not benefit. No 
cash for us whatever it is.” (Female, non-party member villager, 52 years old)
In the Xulian case, the direct benefits for the villagers included improved living conditions and the related 
health and happiness effects. In addition, as the quality of the environment improved, those who had left to 
work elsewhere have returned more frequently, which has become an important source of personal benefit for 
their families. And, of course, the village received the enhanced government grant which, according to the 
Party Secretary, covered the financial loss that some villagers had endured when they removed their buildings 
or ceased farming. . However, not all the villagers saw it in this way:
“The village looks better. There used to be many messy stuffs everywhere, now all 
are gone. …However, the villagers gain no actual benefits. For example, chickens 
and ducks are only allowed to be raised inside houses, but those houses were all 
dismantled (as illegal buildings) … Last year we are subsided at ￥10 per month. 
What could we eat with that much money!” (an old couple of 60 years old, non-
party members)
Beyond the undoubted environmental benefits, the clean and tidy village is now attractive to tourists and 
investors, and is generating development opportunities for at least some of the villagers. Thus it appears to be 
the case that the distribution of responsibilities in Xulian Village generated a number of indirect benefits for 
both the leader and the participants. The capacity of the village to capitalize on these benefits will determine 
the sustainability of the Village Plan in the long term.
The model of responsibility-driven collective action that we have found in Xulian Village has elements which 
seem widely applicable to other villages in China, and around the world. However, the case study also reveals 
an important limitation that could affect its utility on a wider global scale: the key role played by the elderly 
Party members (see Kan, 2016 for a review of the function of village committees). Serious ‘hollowing out’ of 
many villages in China (Long et al., 2011) has made those who remain – usually the elderly - an important 
force in village restructuring. But the size and vitality of this group will inevitably decline as time goes by. It is 
not at all clear how they will be replaced, although some studies have found that other social groups, such as 
the ‘left-behind’ village women can be equally effective in fostering collective action (Du et al., 2019).
6 Conclusion
Collective action has been widely discussed with respect to the management of common pool resources, but 
usually in the context of the distribution of resources rather than responsibilities. In this paper we have 
analyzed an alternative case in rural China in which the principal concern has been how to distribute the costs 
of improving the infrastructure and environment of a village that no longer had access to public funding. In 
undertaking the study, we posed the research question: ‘To what extent can a new form of responsibility-driven 
collective action provide a solution to the under-provision of public goods? Our findings indicate that it is 
possible to conceive of a situation in which the collective, as a whole, takes responsibility for the provision of 
public goods, even when this has a cost that is unlikely to be compensated as a result of the action. Unlike the 
case of benefit distribution in which there is an individual incentive to act collectively, the responsibility-
driven collective action in our case was fostered by strong leadership and a ‘bridge’ to the villagers provided 
by a core group of elders who, between them, motivated and mobilized the villagers into collective action and, 
where necessary, enforced compliance on those villagers who were less inclined to participate.
Our findings demonstrate that the principles of collective action are indeed relevant to scenarios featuring the 
distributions of responsibilities rather than benefits. Our findings also confirm literature suggesting that 
leadership is key (Glowacki and Von Rueden, 2015), but differ in that the private gains to the leader are less 
obvious and immediate than is generally considered to be a condition for action. Indeed, while part of her 
motivation may have involved currying favour with the Party, it is clear from the case study that the Secretary 
was strongly motivated by a wish to improve the village's public realm. The findings further confirm literature 
on the importance of organizing collective action (Hooper et al., 2010; Kan, 2016), to the extent that it does 
not happen spontaneously, and adds to existing work on motivating and mobilizing the collective (Li et al., 
2016; Du et al., 2019). Good leadership here was not about assembling and concentrating power, but about 
redistributing it to the core group and thence to the wider village. This empowered the core group to encourage 
the villagers to act collectively to achieve lasting change through effective and efficient enforcement of 
individual responsibilities. This led to stable and long-term improvement in the quality of the village 
environment and its management.
Our findings on the nature and operation of responsibility-driven collective action are likely to be transferable 
to many of the villages in China that are experiencing similar social and environmental challenges. However, 
when looking to the future, other types of ‘bridging’ group will need to be developed to replace the elderly 
Party members, who will not be around forever. More generally, our articulation of responsibility-driven 
collective action as a new and under-researched form of community organization suggests to us that there is a 
potentially rich theme of work to be developed that has applicability beyond China. Indeed, as many national 
governments seek to withdraw from their financial commitments to the local state, many small and remote 
communities across the World may be faced with the imperative of fostering action for which there is no 
immediate pecuniary benefit to the individual. We believe that our case study of Xulian Village and the 
leadership qualities exhibited by Shen, its Party Secretary, offer new insights into how collective 
responsibilities may be mobilized in ways that lead to sustainable improvements in the environment and lives 
of rural communities, whether in China or beyond.
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characteristics and influencing factors are analyzed.
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